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L Facts
On the night of August 31, 1988, Kevin Dean Young ("Young") with
two cohorts, William Bell ("Bell") and John Glenn ("Glenn"), accosted and
attempted to rob elementary school principal Dennis Hepler ("Hepler") in
Anderson, South Carolina. Hepler was fatally shot in the back during the
melee. Young was apprehended, tried, and convicted of murder in the
course of an armed robbery. The jury subsequently recommended death.
Due to evidentiary errors tainting the sentencing procedure, a second jury
was called to recommend a sentence for Young's capital murder conviction;
it likewise recommended the death penalty.'
Young exhausted all of his avenues of state relief and applied for a
federal writ of habeas corpus in the district court. The Director of the
South Carolina Department of Corrections and the state's Attorney General
moved for summary judgment on this application. A magistrate judge
considered this motion and concluded that Young's application should be
denied. On subsequent de novo review, the district court also denied
Young's application for habeas relief. Young appealed from this determina-
tion of the district court to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Cirquit for consideration of the following assertions: (1) his lawyer's
deficient representation violated Young's Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel; and (2) the court's refusal at resentencing to
instruct the jury that a recommendation of life imprisonment for Young
would mandate his serving at least thirty years in prison prior to his parole
eligibility violated his due process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.'
1. Young v. Catoe, Nos. 99-6, 99-8, 2000 WL 245318, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 29, 2000).
2. Motions for summary judgment may properly be heard before a magistrate judge
initially. See 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(B) (1999). However, upon a timely filed written objection
to the determination of the magistrate, a petitioner is entitled to de novo review by the
district court. See 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1) (1999).




The Fourth Circuit, finding no ground upon which to grant Young a
writ of habeas corpus, affirmed the decision of the district court and denied
his application.
III. Analysis/Application in Virginia
Young's two constitutional claims argued before the Fourth Circuit
were first heard and rejected by both the South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas ("PCR court") and the Supreme Court of South Carolina.' The
Fourth Circuit's review of these claims was limited by changes to federal
habeas law caused by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ("AEDPA").6 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) permits federal courts to grant a
writ of habeas corpus on an issue adjudicated in state courts only if the
proceedings resulted in either (1) a decision contrary to clearly established
federal law or (2) a decision based upon an unreasonable determination of
the facts considering the evidence presented at trial." Since the court deter-
mined that minimal factual dispute existed, the Fourth Circuit was required
to find fault with the state's application of the relevant Supreme Court
authorities to the facts in order to grant federal habeas relief.F
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Trial Strategy Background and the Strickland Standard
Young was represented by attorney James Robert Mann ("Mann"), a
former prosecutor retained by Young's family.9 Ascertaining that the case
against Young was strong, Mann decided to adopt a trial strategy of being
straightforward with the jury on the issue of guilt and emphasizing Young's
remorse in order to enhance Mann's own credibility and that of his client
in hopes of avoiding a death sentence.10 However, Mann's opening state-
ment to the jury contained two blatant misstatements of South Carolina
law-that Young had no right to plead guilty and that malice, a necessary
element of capital murder in South Carolina, could be presumed from
4. Id., at *12.
5. Id., at *2.
6. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153); 28
U.S.C. S 2254 (1999).
.7. 28 U.S.C. S 2254.
8. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *3.
9. Id., at *4.
10. Id. The evidence causing Mann's bleak view of the defense case consisted of (1)
Young's oral confession to the police that he and Bell had both shot Hepler, (2) the autopsy
report revealing that the gunshot to Hepler's back, not the one to his head, had been fatal,
and (3) Young's confession to Mann that he had fired the shot into Hepler's back. Id.
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Young's use of a deadly weapon." Throughout the trial, Mann either chose
not to cross-examine or to cross-examine only briefly the state's witnesses.
12
Mann later called Young to the stand where Young testified to both the
chance meeting with Hepler, which resulted in his accidental shooting of
Hepler, and Bell's subsequent shooting in the direction of Hepler's head."'
Mann then attempted to call Glenn, who immediately invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 4 The defense then rested.
In his closing statement, Mann continued to argue that, although Young was
technically guilty, he never planned to kill Hepler and that this was not the
type of murder that should warrant the death penalty."5
The Fourth Circuit relied on the standard of review of ineffective
assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington.16 Strickland
requires a petitioner making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to
show both (1) that counsel's performance was indeed deficient and (2) that
the petitioner suffered prejudice due to counsel's errors." The performance
prong of the test requires an evaluation of whether the performance "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness."" The Young court noted
the strong presumption in counsel's favor manifest within this prong. 9 To
meet the prejudice requirement, a petitioner "must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.""
2. Concession of Guilt and Malice
Young's first claim of deficient counsel was based upon Mann's conces-
sion of Young's guilt during his opening and closing statements. 2' The
11. Id., at *5. In South Carolina, any defendant can enter a valid plea of guilty and
forgo trial. See S.C. CODE ANN. S 17-23-80 (Law. Co-op. 1985). The presumption of malice
from use of a deadly weapon was rejected by the Supreme Court of South Carolina six years
prior to the argument of Young's case. See State v. Elmore, 308 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1983),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 n.5 (S.C. 1991) (Toal, J.,
concurring). The proper treatment of malice in a deadly weapon case after Elmore is that the
factfinder "may" imply malice from the use of such a weapon. Id. at 784.
12. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *5.
13. Id., at *5.
14. Id.
15. Id., at *6.
16. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
17. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
18. Id. at 688 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
19. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *6.
20. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Fourth Circuit noted that this "probability" was
defined in Strickland as a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *6 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *7.
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Fourth Circuit rejected this claim at the first step of the Strickland test,
recognizing that case law supports such a line of defense when "there is
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt."" The Court recognized
that the decision of the PCR court that counsel's actions were reasonable
was founded upon such case law which can be read for the proposition that,
"on occasion, it is best to risk losing the battle in the hope of winning the
war."23 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found the lower court's decision to be
consistent with the applicable jurisprudence. That is all that is required
under the standard of review mandated by AEDPA.24
3. Concession of Fatal Shot
Young likewise alleged deficient counsel because Mann admitted during
the trial that Young had fired the fatal shot.2" The Fourth Circuit accepted
the decision of the PCR court, finding this concession reasonable because
Mann was forced to depict Young as having fired the shot at Hepler's back
in order for the wound to be consistent with Mann's trial theory that
Young had shot Hepler by accident.26 The Fourth Circuit further noted
that forcing the state to prove that Young fired the fatal shot would not
have helped his case since South Carolina has adopted the "hand of one,
hand of all" doctrine which states that "when two or more persons aid,
encourage, and abet each other in the commission of a crime, all being
present, all are principals and equally guilty.""'
22. Id., at *8 (quoting Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421,429 (4th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that
remarks distancing counsel from the defendant were a valid trial strategy designed to
maintain counsel's credibility with the jury despite the short-term harm to the defendant).
23. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *8.
24. Id. The court found Young's claim to fall short of the rejudice requirement of
Strickland as well, finding that the testimony of the arresting officer and Young himself
introduced similar evidence, thereby destroying the possibility of any substantial prejudice
caused by this third evidentiary source of Young's guilt. Id., at *9. Note that the court was
not required to consider prejudice under the Strickland analysis because Young failed to meet
the performance prong and both prongs must be met in order to sustain a claim of deficient
counsel.
25. Id., at *9.
26. Id. Note, however, that the state's evidence proved inconclusive on this point. Id.
27. Id. (quoting State v. Hicks, 185 S.E.2d 746, 748 (S.C. 1971)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit also noted Young's failure to prove any prejudice caused
by this concession. Since Young had already admitted to the arresting officer that he had
shot Hepler, a fact to which the officer testified in court, and because Young admitted on the
stand that he had shot Hepler in the back, the effect of Mann's concession could not have
significantly prejudiced Young's case. Id.
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B. Simmons Extension
Young also contended that the court erred during resentencing for its
failure to instruct the jury that, were Young to be sentenced to life impris-
onment, he would not be parole eligible for thirty years."8 Young advanced
two arguments to support this allegation of constitutional error. First,
Young argued that his proposed instruction was mandated by the United
States Supreme Court in Simmons v. South Carolina,29 which held that jurors
must be told, if parole is unavailable, that "life means life."3" This argument
is grounded in the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits states from limiting sentencers' consideration
of any relevant fact that might cause them to decline to impose the death
penalty.31
The holding in Simmons was limited to the context in which a state
seeks to show that the defendant will be a future danger to society, then and
only then requiring an instruction informing the jury that the defendant
will never be paroled if a life sentence is given in a jurisdiction where "life
means life." 2 Although the Fourth Circuit noted that the prosecution relied
to some extent on a finding of future dangerousness during resentencing, the
court also noted its prior rejection of such a Simmons-extension claim in
Roach v. Angelone." Thus, the court rejected this Eighth Amendment
argument.3 4
Young's second argument was based upon juror confusion during the
voir dire. Young argued that the record showed that some jurors thought
he might receive less than the thirty years in prison if sentenced to life
28. Id., at *10.
29. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
30. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994).
31. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *10 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824
(1991)). This right to an informed jury is only one of the procedural protections guaranteed
by the Eighth Amendment. For a detailed discussion of the various substantive and proce-
dural protections guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment, see Kimberly A. Orem, Evolution
ofan Eighth Amendment Dichotomy: Substantive and Procedural Protections within the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause in Capital Cases, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 345 (2000).
32. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156. Note that the requirement of a "life means life" instruc-
tion has recently been held to apply to non-future dangerousness cases in Virginia. See
Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (Va. 1999) (holding that "in the context
of a capital murder trial a jury's knowledge of the lack of availability of parole is necessary"
to prevent a harsher sentence recommendation by the jury than would have been given had
the jury known that "life means life").
33. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *10-11; see Roach v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 210, 220 (4th
Cir. 1999) (noting that "[i]n a state in which parole is available, the Constitution does not
require (or preclude) jury consideration of that fact"); seealso Kimberly A. Orem, Case Note,
12 CAP. DEF. J. 227 (1999) (analyzing Roach).
34. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *11.
2000]
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imprisonment." The Fourth Circuit also rejected this argument, stating that
Young was given "more than he asked for" when the judge instructed the
jury that "the terms 'life imprisonment' and 'death sentence' should be
understood in their ordinary and plain meaning."36 Since juries are pre-
sumed to follow the instructions of the court, the Fourth Circuit found the
trial court's refusal to give Young's proposed instruction reasonable. 7
C. Application to Capital Representation in Virginia
Although a Simmons-extension claim may seem futile in light of the
consistent line of Virginia jurisprudence rejecting it, the recent expansion in
Yarbrough v. Commonwealth38 suggests a renewed interest in fully informed
capital juries.39
Another important issue raised by Young is whether a concession of
guilt is consistent with zealous advocacy.' In Young, the Fourth Circuit
seemed to find acceptable, and even desirable in certain situations, a trial
strategy involving a significant concession of guilt when coupled with
evidence of remorse.4' Whether Young was an appropriate case for a conces-
sion of guilt, or whether the concession was artfully made, may be ques-
tioned. Concessions of guilt in specific forms and circumstances are not,
however, necessarily inconsistent with zealous representation.42
If the Commonwealth will present overwhelming evidence of the
defendant's involvement in the homicide, but will have difficulty proving
capital murder,43 an early concession of responsibility for the homicide may
35. Id.
36. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
37. Id.
38. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
39. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999). For an in-depth discus-
sion of Yarbrougb and its implications in capital cases, see Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note,
12 CAP. DEF. J. 279 (1999) (analyzing Yarbrougb).
40. Note that an attorney is required to obtain the defendant's approval prior to
making such statements since the statements comprise, essentially, a guilty plea. In cases
where consent was not obtained, courts have sustained ineffective assistance of counsel claims
of error even without a finding of prejudice. See Nixon v. Singletary, Nos. SC92006, SC93192,
2000 WL 63415, at *4 (Fla. Jan. 27, 2000).
41. Young, 2000 WL 245318, at *8. Mann made the following comments during his
opening statement to the jury which Young attacked as concessions of guilt: "He's guilty.
He acknowledges his guilt. Technically he's guilty. Morally he's guilty." Id., at *5. These
statements can be reconciled with Mann's defensive position of conciliation and his theory
of accidental shooting. Note that none of these statements were concessions to Young's guilt
for capital murder.
42. The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse maintains its position that a plea of guilty
should not be entered in a capital case unless there is very substantial judicial assurance that
a sentence of death will not be imposed.
43. This situation may present itself in cases in which the Commonwealth has strong
422 [Vol. 12:2
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be appropriate. The concession diminishes the force of the Common-
wealth's homicide evidence and tends to focus the jury's attention on the
crucial capital murder issues in the guilt/innocence case. There is also the
situation in which (1) the Commonwealth will present overwhelming
evidence that the defendant is guilty of capital murder, (2) there is no
credible substantive defense evidence, and (3) the Commonwealth's case for
death is weak and/or the defense case for life is strong. In such a case, it
may be appropriate simply to put the Commonwealth to its proof and forgo
the defense of innocence. Doing so avoids facing a jury in the sentencing
phase which has already seen and rejected defense evidence. The likelihood
is that the jury will then give greater credence to the defendant's mitigation
evidence.
There are, no doubt, many other examples. Determining whether to
make a concession in any form is a decision which each capital defense
attorney must carefully consider, taking into account the strength of the
Commonwealth's evidence for guilt and aggravating circumstances and also
the strength of any possible defensive postures and mitigation evidence.
Kimberly A. Orem
evidence of the defendant's involvement in the homicide but lacks evidence suggesting that
the defendant was the triggerman in the killing. This strategy may also be acceptable when
the Commonwealth has strong evidence of the defendant's commission of the homicide but
not of premeditation, a necessary element in all capital murder cases.
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